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1 Overview
Attribute-based encryption is a form of encryption which offers the capacity to encrypt data such that it
is only accessible to individuals holding a satisfactory configuration of attributes. As cloud and distributed
computing become more pervasive in both private and public spheres, attribute-based encryption holds
potential to address the issue of achieving secure authentication, authorization, and transmission in these
environments where performance must scale with security while also supporting fine-grained access control
among a massively large number of consumers. With this work, we offer an example generic configurable
stateless protocol for secure attribute-based authentication, authorization, storage, and transmission in
distributed storage systems based upon ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE), discuss
the experience of implementing a distributed storage system around this protocol, and present future av-
enues of work enabled by such a protocol. The key contribution of this work is an illustration of a means
by which any CP-ABE system may be utilized in a black-box manner for attribute-based authentication
and cryptographically enforced attribute-based access control in distributed storage systems.
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2 Background
In this section, we (1) provide an introduction to attribute-based encryption, (2) briefly introduce the
premise and significance of distributed storage, and (3) motivate a need for a secure attribute-based
authentication, authorization, storage, and transmission protocol by identifying security concerns in the
distributed systems underlying cloud environments.
2.1 Attribute-based Encryption
Attribute-based encryption (ABE) is a form of encryption first proposed by Sahai and Waters as an
application of fuzzy identity-based encryption, a type of encryption through which data is encrypted
on the basis of individual identity as represented by a set of attributes [9]. Goyal et. al. later ex-
plored the topic in more detail, presenting attribute-based encryption as a generalization of this con-
struction in which data is encrypted according to some logical expression of attributes, called an ac-
cess policy, such that encrypted data can only be decrypted if that policy is satisfied [5]. The au-
thors of [5] further defined a formal security setting for an ABE scheme: in addition to the cryp-
tographic guarantees (e.g. IND-CPA security) expected of encryption schemes in general, a useful
ABE scheme must also be resistant to collusion attacks, defined as an attack in which one or more
key holders attempt to decrypt data for which they are otherwise not authorized by sharing keys.
In its discussion of attribute-based encryption, the authors of [5] discuss two forms of attribute-based en-
cryption: ciphertext-policy ABE (CP-ABE) and key-policy ABE (KP-ABE). The core difference between
ciphertext-policy ABE and key-policy ABE lies in the logical location of the access policy: in CP-ABE, a
set of attributes is associated with a key, and encrypted data can be decrypted only if those attributes sat-
isfy the access policy associated with it; in KP-ABE, a set of attributes is associated with encrypted data,
and data can be decrypted only if those attributes satisfy a policy associated with the key being used. To il-
lustrate both the utility of ABE and the differences between CP-ABE and KP-ABE, consider the following
two illustrative scenarios:
Scenario 1 : Company C maintains a file F which contains confidential salary information for employees
in New York. F should be encrypted and stored such that it can only be read by either the company
CEO or managers in New York.
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This end could be achieved using CP-ABE as follows: first, grant users keys containing attributes cor-
responding to their position and their office location; next, encrypt F using the policy CEO or (Manager
and New York). In the future, depending on the security of the chosen ABE scheme and its applica-
tion context, only an individual whose key satisfies this policy may decrypt and read the contents of F.
Scenario 2 : Agency D maintains a file F which contains a report on confidential material. Each section
of the report contains content surrounding some subset of topics. An individual A is authorized to read
any classified material so long as it concerns both Europe and agriculture.
This end could be achieved using KP-ABE as follows: first, encrypt F in segments, associating a
set of attributes corresponding to the set of sensitive topics contained. Next, issue A a key with the
policy Europe and Agriculture. A will then, depending on the relative security of the ABE scheme, be
able to decrypt and read only those sections containing information on both Europe and agriculture.
As is iterated in [5], CP-ABE and KP-ABE are suited towards different use cases. Intuitively, between the
two components required for decryption–ciphertext and key– the one with which the policy is associated
imposes a more selective condition than the other. As we are concerned with use cases in which access to
remote data by consumers is controlled by policy, this work makes exclusive use of CP-ABE.
2.2 Ciphertext-policy Attribute-based Encryption
A valid CP-ABE scheme must provide four algorithms: Setup, Encrypt, GenerateKey, and Decrypt [13],
defined in greater detail below:
• Setup(λ,U): Takes a security parameter λ and a description of attributes within the system U and
outputs a set of public parameters PK and a master key MK.
• Encrypt(PK,M,A): Takes a set of public parameters PK, a message to encrypt M, and an access
policy A expressed in terms of attributes and outputs a ciphertext C, generally assumed to also
contain A.
• GenerateKey(MK,S): Takes a master key MK and a set of attributes that should be associated
with the key S and outputs a private key SK.
• Decrypt(PK,C,SK): Takes a set of public parameters PK, a ciphertext to decrypt C, and a secret
key SK and outputs the decrypted message M.
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In works such as [2], authors have since introduced extensions to CP-ABE which allow for the construc-
tion of multi-authority CP-ABE schemes. In multi-authority and hierarchical CP-ABE schemes, multiple
authorities work with one another to generate keys (at times with each authority being responsible for
some possibly disjoint subset of attributes).
Although these variants of ABE define slightly different interfaces for each algorithm, for the sake of
this work, any reference to Setup or GenerateKey may be assumed to reference the interface provided
by any one individual CP-ABE scheme (single-authority, multiple-authority, or otherwise) so long as
said scheme (a) defines Encrypt and Decrypt as specified and (b) does not assume a static universe of
attributes.
2.3 Cloud Computing and Distributed Storage
Cloud computing is a model which enables on-demand access to a shared pool of configurable computing
resources; a primary objective of cloud computing is the capacity to rapidly provision and release these
resources with minimal effort on the part of the service provider as required by the measured needs of
consumers; this allows applications to arbitrarily scale to meet the needs of one consumer or billions of
consumers [8]. NIST defines three service models of cloud computing: Software as a Service (SaaS), Plat-
form as a Service (PaaS), and Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS): SaaS allows shared access to the providers
application running on cloud infrastructure; PaaS provides shared access and management of languages,
tools, and services required to deploy an application; IaaS provides shared access to fundamental hardware
resources such as disk space, networks, and CPU cores [8].
Data-intensive applications that ultimately either rely on or support SaaS or PaaS service models
inherently require logical data storage and access at scale. While all service models guarantee that storage
space may be provisioned as necessary, support for shared distributed storage among these resources is
required by applications which need to operate concurrently on contiguous data. To meet this need in a
manner optimal for their respective use cases, various distributed storage systems have been developed.
To provide a non-exhaustive set of examples: GFS is a distributed storage system developed by Google to
provide general-case fault-tolerant, scalable storage over commodity hardware [4]; HDFS is a distributed
storage system implemented to meet the storage needs of a specific cluster computing framework [10];
DynamoDB is a distributed storage system implemented by Amazon to support the access pattern defined
by its shopping cart feature [3].
2.4 Security in Distributed Storage Systems
While the many distributed storage systems which exist are intentionally highly performant, available, and
scalable, their initial design does not directly guarantee congruent security of stored data. In this section,
we demonstrate the deficiencies that exist in such systems with respect to confidentiality and integrity
of data stored, and we further illustrate the limits of common approaches to addressing these deficiencies.
Confidentiality. Consider the confidentiality of data stored by a distributed storage system. If, as de-
scribed in [4],[10], and [3], stored resources are served to any requesting entity, the confidentiality of data
intended to be accessible by a specific subset of users cannot be guaranteed. A distributed storage sys-
tem expected to ensure confidentiality of data must implement some means of access control; to do so,
such a system must also have a means of reliably discerning an authorized user from a non-authorized
user (potentially via authentication) and subsequently enforcing access control. Confidentiality, how-
ever, is still not absolutely guaranteed by sound authentication, authorization, and access control: if
data is stored in the clear, any unauthorized party gaining access to a storage node inevitably gains
access to the data residing at that node. Similarly, if data or control messages are transmitted in the
clear, an unauthorized party may gain knowledge of data directly or indirectly by simply eavesdropping.
Integrity. Consider the integrity of data stored by a distributed storage system. If both system components
and consumers accept control messages and data transferred blindly, an attacker could potentially influence
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either the server or the client to accept invalid data by modifying the stream of data sent. Similarly, if an
attacker gains access to a storage node, integrity is trivially compromised by means of the fact that such an
attacker may then arbitrarily modify data. This latter risk to integrity is somewhat offset by the structure
of distributed storage systems making use of replication: in such systems, breaches to integrity may be cor-
rected by means of copying from a replica.
Though offering secure access control, storage, and transmission may allow a distributed storage sys-
tem to preserve the confidentiality and integrity of stored data, the question of how a distributed storage
system might do so in a genuinely secure manner without affecting performance or scalability of the
system remains a challenge. In practice, systems attempt to resolve these concerns by means of either
symmetric-key encryption and/or public-key encryption; however, the constraints imposed by conven-
tional symmetric and public-key cryptography degrade feasibility and security at scale in an environment
in which resources are not restricted based upon the unique identity of the consumer.
As an example, HDFS, a popular distributed storage system used commonly in support of cluster
computing, implements an approach which utilizes symmetric-key encryption: HDFS introduces the notion
of an encryption zone, in which the aim is for files to be securely shared between consumers in a zone
[1]. Each file in an encryption zone is encrypted using a symmetric cipher using a random key, which is
itself stored encrypted under a zone encryption key, shared among all consumers in the zone [1]. This
approach, however, merits caution with respect to both security and feasibility. With respect to security,
this approach may not be optimal, as it requires keys to be shared between a large number of consumers
for large zones; with respect to feasibility, this approach may not be optimal, as each consumer must store
one key for each to which he or she has access.
Unlike symmetric-key and group-based approaches to addressing the above issues, an approach utiliz-
ing attribute-based encryption inherently comes with the capacity to express fine-grained access control
without having to track the identity of users or perform burdensome key management at a scale linear
in the number of groups of files to which a user has access. Furthermore, attribute-based cryptography
admits a means for allowing consumers to authenticate and be authorized on a basis other than identity,
a pattern more suited for distributed storage systems seeking security at scale.
2.5 Related Work
Attribute-based encryption has been identified previously as a potentially useful basis for security in
distributed storage systems and cloud computing. Early works on attribute-based encryption such as [5]
and [9] reference applications for which ABE may be promising, including broadcast log encryption, an
application also essential for the auditing of the distributed systems underlying cloud environments.
Other works, such as [6], [7], and [12], point out potential gaps in ABE as given canonically, aiming
specifically to provide some extension of ABE which might satisfy the requirements of a storage application
in a cloud environment. [12] aims to introduce a provably secure hierarchical ABE (H-ABE) construction
to allow for more flexibility in system architectures employing ABE; [7] aims to provide a multi-authority
ABE construction to fulfill a similar need while also fulfilling anonymity requirements; [6] identifies a
particular necessary capability of large-scale operating systems–key revocation–and provides a provably
secure construction meant to reduce the computational burden of key revocation at the cost of a slight
overhead in encryption and decryption. CP-ABE, Wang et. al. have proposed a system called Sieve
which utilizes KP-ABE in untrusted cloud environments, with a particular focus on web services. [11].
This work is distinct from previous works in that, rather than providing a specific ABE construction
or a system to be utilized by other systems and services, it provides (a) a generic configurable protocol
which uses CP-ABE to achieve secure access, storage, and transmission of distributed resources in generic
distributed storage systems and (b) a generic threat model that may be used to analyze any such protocol
providing access control on the basis of attributes. As a result, a system utilizing this protocol may opt to
choose one from among all ABE schemes according to its unique performance and security expectations;
likewise, the threat model provided may be used as a basis of analysis for alternative systems and protocols.
The protocol proposed further separates the function of recovery from the cryptographic scheme used,
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providing a feasible means of directly performing key revocation and recovery without having to rely on
ad-hoc qualities of the configured cryptosystem.
3 The Protocol
In this section, we (1) introduce a general, high-level architecture abstraction used to represent the system
which will house our proposed protocol, (2) briefly introduce preliminaries of our proposed protocol, and
finally (3) outline the protocol.
3.1 System Setting
The basic protocol introduced is defined with respect to a system which provides access to distributed
resources to consumers (semi-anonymous or identified) who interact with the system on the basis of their
attributes. Such a system is assumed to be composed of some number of system components called nodes,
each of which taking one of the following roles with respect to the protocol:
• Authorization Node: Entity responsible for performing authorization of consumers on some subset
of attributes recognized within the system.
• Service Node: Entity responsible for providing a secure interface to some subset of partitions of
distributed resources. Consumers communicate with service nodes to access or modify distributed
resources.
• Authority : Entity responsible for creating keys and arbitrating the global universe of attributes
recognized by the system. An authority may delegate to other components to perform key distribu-
tion1.
1The protocol given admits potentially many key distribution schemes. See Future Work
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Figure 1: Example configuration of roles among system components.
Figure 1 provides an illustration of such an architecture containing m authorization nodes and n
disjoint service nodes. A consumer first authenticates to and is authorized by an authorization node for
some subset of attributes, and he or she is then serviced by service node 1 on partition x and service node
n on partition y. This specific configuration of component roles reflects a system architecture using many
(m) masters and many (n) storage nodes.
Though the example in Figure 1 is specific, the abstract system setting described may be configured
to map to any general distributed storage system: this configuration may be modified, for example, to
map to a single-master system by reducing the number of authorization nodes to one; alternatively, it
could be modified to map to quorum-like system architectures by making the sets of authorization nodes
and service nodes non-disjoint2. Note also that this setting allows a system to decouple the location of
consumer authorization from the location of the master key holder (the authority) within the utilized
ABE scheme; any such coordination of roles may be easily extended to employ multiple or hierarchical
authorities if using a multiple-authority ABE scheme.
3.2 Preliminaries
The proposed protocol makes use of additional abstractions defined with respect to attributes.
Definition 3.1. Representation The representation of an attribute is the functional component of a
named attribute within an ABE construction. 3
2This latter case would require the coordination techniques applied in quorum-like systems to also be applied to autho-
rization nodes. See Future Work
3Example: in a hypothetical ABE scheme in which an attribute is manipulated or applied mathematically using a group
element unique to that attribute, the representation of an attribute would be its respective group element.
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Definition 3.2. Volatile Attribute A volatile attribute is an attribute whose representation may be
expected to change.
Definition 3.3. Manifest Attribute A manifest attribute is an attribute whose representation must nec-
essarily be known to parties outside of the set of system components.
Definition 3.4. Bound Attribute A bound attribute is an attribute whose representation is coupled with
the state of some resource.
To illustrate the meanings and uses of these abstractions, consider the task of encrypting a large file
using ABE. If the policy on the file involves the attribute A, A becomes a bound attribute. If F must
be accessible to external consumers, A also becomes a manifest attribute. We would hope that A is not
also a volatile attribute, as any change in its representation would cause the system to need to re-encrypt
F ; similarly, if a volatile attribute A were to become manifest, it may become necessary to propagate the
new representation of A to interested consumers.
In addition to these abstractions of attributes, the protocol proposed defines additional constructs to
be used in the authentication and authorization process.
Definition 3.5. Master Session Token (MST) An object produced as a result of authorization which
authenticates consumer attributes to a service node and contains authorization from an authorization
node.
Definition 3.6. Validity Attribute A validity attribute is a volatile, manifest attribute assigned to con-
sumers whose primary role is to attest to the validity of the key of a requesting consumer. When a
consumer authenticates to an authorization node, the consumer must specify a set of held validity at-
tributes, and the produced MST is sent such that it may only be used if the consumer holds all of the
attributes with which he or she authenticated as well as the validity attributes specified. A validity
attribute will never be bound to a file resource served by the protocol.
3.3 Protocol Definition
The proposed protocol is composed of seven configured algorithmic components:
1. An attribute-based encryption scheme EABE
2. An attribute-based encryption scheme under a variable-length mode of encryption ECHAIN
4
3. (Optional) An attribute-based signature scheme SSIG
4. A public-key signature scheme SPSIG
5. A variable-length symmetric-key encryption scheme ESYM
6. A MAC scheme MAC
7. A secure key exchange routine RKE
The only constraint placed on these components is that EABE must be able to encrypt ciphertexts
at least as large as the size of keys and parameters for ESYM . If there is no single entity that is to
be absolutely identifiable among system components, SSIG should be configured as an attribute-based
signature scheme. If SSIG is not configured, public-key SPSIG is used in its place.
In addition to the configured algorithms, the following parameters must also be configured:
1. Role assignment for system components (mapping system components among authorities, service
nodes, and authorization nodes)
4This may be derived from EABE . See Implementation and Future Work.
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2. Parameters x and u, respectively configuring the number of validity attributes to be used by the
system and the minimum number of validity attributes a consumer must advertise in order to
authenticate.
System initialization. At system initialization, the configured authority (or authorities) perform the
Setup algorithm as specified by EABE , with an initial universe U containing an attribute SN to be issued
for provisioned service nodes, an attribute ai for each initial generic manifest attribute to associate with
consumers and to be bound to stored resources, an attribute ANAj for each subset of attributes Aj to be
authorized exclusively by some subset of authorization nodes, and all validity attributes v1...vx.
Addition of new components. When a new authorization node is provisioned, that node is issued a
ABE key containing the attribute ANAj corresponding to the subset of attributes Aj for which it is re-
sponsible for authorizing and a public key pair if SSIG has not been configured. When a new service node
is provisioned, that node is issued an ABE key containing the attribute ANAj and all validity attributes.
Note: This protocol allows component locations and responsibilities to be public knowledge. For the
sake of simplicity and generality, this work assumes that there is a public index of all public parameters
(including a whitelist of locations, responsibilities, and public parameters of EABE) that reflects changes
immediately; private changes (including the issuance of keys) are assumed to be communicated by means
of a generic secure key distribution mechanism. Exploration of specific key distribution and knowledge
propagation mechanisms for specific applications of this protocol may be valuable; see Future Work.
The protocol defines four routines: Attribute-Authenticate, Put, Get, and Write.
3.3.1 Attribute-Authenticate
A consumer C negotiates with an authorization node M to authenticate a set of attributes A it would
like to use during its session. At the end of a valid negotiation, C receives a MST from M.
1. C and M perform RKE . All subsequent communication is encrypted using ESYM and authenticated
using MAC under the derived key.
2. C sends A = a1, ..., an ∣∣ V = v1, ..., vu ∣∣ TTLreq ∣∣ PKself to M.
TTLreq is a requested TTL for the MST ; PKself is a public key for the requesting consumer (not
tracked by the system).
3. M derives the subset of A, A′, which it is allowed to authorize.
4. M chooses expiry as the minimum of TTLreq and a maximum TTL plus the current time.
5. M generates two random ESYM key-parameter pairs K1, K2 and a random R.
6. M computes and sends K ′ = EncryptEABE(PK,K1, (∧ni=0ai) ∧ (∧uj=0vj)) to C.
7. M computes MST1 = EABE(K2, SN ∧ (∧uj=0vj)) ∣∣ A′ ∣∣ expiry ∣∣ R ∣∣ PKself .
8. M computes MST2 = SSIG(MST1,Mprivate)
Mprivate corresponds to either the private component of the authorizaton node’s public-key keypair
or the authorizaton node’s ABE private key, depending on the configuration of the protocol.
9. M computes MST3 = EncryptESYM (K1 ∣∣ expiry ∣∣ R,K2).
10. M computes MST =MST1 ∣∣MST2 ∣∣MST3 ∣∣Mpublic.
Mpublic is the public key for the authorization node if SSIG is configured as a public-key signature
scheme. Otherwise, Mpublic is an indication of the authorization node attribute ANAj held by the
authorization node.
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11. M computes and sends MST ′ = EncryptESYM (MST,K1) to C.
12. C decrypts K ′ to obtain K1 and retrieves MST by decrypting MST ′ with K1.
When a service node N receives a MST , it must verify the validity of the MST . A service node N verifies
a MST as follows:
1. Validate that the contained Mpublic corresponds to a valid authorization node for the set of attributes
A′ specified by the MST. If SSIG is configured as an attribute-based signature scheme, N simply
checks that the specified Mpublic contains ANAj corresponding to the subset of attributes specified.
2. N validates the content of the MST via the signature.
3. N obtains K2 from MST1 and decrypts MST3 using K2.
4. N then verifies that R and expiry agree between MST1 and MST3.
5. N verifies that the MST has not expired.
3.3.2 Put
A consumer C negotiates with a service node N to persist a new resource in the system.
1. C and N perform RKE . All subsequent communication is encrypted using ESYM and authenticated
using MAC under the derived key.
2. C sends N a MST.
3. C sends N an identifier for the new resource, an access policy for new resource, and the size of new
resource to be transferred.
4. N validates the MST and further validates that the attributes authorized in the MST satisfy the
policy specified.
5. C sends encrypted resource content D as EncryptESYM (EncryptECHAIN (D,policy),K1), optionally
through an encryption proxy, and SPSIG(EncryptECHAIN (D,policy), SKself). SKself is the private
component of the PKself included in the sent MST.
6. N accepts if and only if the signature verifies.
3.3.3 Get
A consumer C negotiates with a service node N to request a distributed resource F.
1. C and N perform RKE . All subsequent communication is encrypted using ESYM and authenticated
using MAC under the derived key.
2. C sends N an identifier for F and any application-related request parameters.
3. C sends N a MST.
4. N validates the MST and further validates that the attributes authorized in the MST satisfy the
policy on F.
5. N sends EncryptESYM (EncryptECHAIN (F, policy),K1) to C.
6. C decrypts using K1 and its private ABE key.
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3.3.4 Write
A consumer C negotiates with a service node N to modify a distributed resource F.
1. C and N perform RKE . All subsequent communication is encrypted using ESYM and authenticated
using MAC under the derived key.
2. C sends N an identifier for F and any application-related request parameters (e.g. range to write).
3. C sends N a MST.
4. N validates the MST and further validates that the attributes authorized in the MST satisfy the
policy on F.
5. C sends modified resource data D′ as EncryptESYM (EncryptECHAIN(D′, policy)),K1), optionally
through an encryption proxy, and SPSIG(EncryptECHAIN (D′, policy), PSK).
6. N accepts if and only if the signature matches.
4 Analysis
In this section we introduce a general threat model for a distributed storage system utilizing attributes for
authentication, authorization, transmission, and storage and discuss the security of the proposed protocol
within the framework of this threat model.
4.1 Threat Model
In a distributed storage environment consisting of consumers, authorization nodes, service nodes, and
authorities interacting on a basis of attributes, we express a threat model with respect to assets, agents,
and adversaries.
Definition 4.1. Asset An asset is any resource accessed, modified, or used via the system, including
private keys.
Definition 4.2. Agent An agent is an entity which either actively or passively interacts with the system.
Definition 4.3. Adversary An adversary is an agent who attempts to induce compromise in the system.
Our threat model qualifies security as a distributed storage system’s ability to avoid, prevent, and
react to the compromise of concerned assets. An asset is considered compromised if any of the following
conditions are met:
• An agent not granted a satisfying set of attributes with respect to an implicit or explicit access
policy on an asset gains access, degrading confidentiality of the concerned asset.
• An agent not granted a satisfying set of attributes causes a permanent modification, degrading
integrity of the concerned asset.
• An agent granted a satisfying set of attributes is deceived into accepting an asset that has been
tampered with, degrading both availability and integrity.
Our model further classifies real and potential compromises according to properties of their conse-
quences and severity.
Definition 4.4. Online-recoverable compromise A compromise is online-recoverable under a protocol if
the system may feasibly harden to correct and prevent said compromise without halting system operation.
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Definition 4.5. Local compromise A compromise is local under a protocol if it may only affect the asset
it concerns.
Definition 4.6. Forward compromise A compromise is forward under a protocol if it cannot induce
additional compromise of resources transferred or held in the past.
Our threat model assumes that an adversary has the ability to eavesdrop and tamper with any com-
munication between agents and that an adversary has substantial computational resources; adversaries
may collude and share resources with one another, including compromised assets. We define a weaker
definition of this threat model in which the attack surface is restricted solely to the routines and commu-
nication defined by the protocol; we define a stronger definition where the attack surface is assumed to be
expanded to subsume individual system components, client machines, operators, and network resources,
allowing for direct exfiltration of assets as well as insider adversaries and impersonators.
4.2 Analysis of Proposed Protocol
In this section, we analyze the given protocol through the lens of the given threat model defined in the
previous section. For each attack surface exposed by the protocol, we enumerate and classify risks of
compromise conditioned upon the configuration of the protocol.
4.2.1 Attribute-Authenticate
Under the weak threat model, we demonstrate that the Attribute-Authenticate routine is secure with
respect to all transferred assets against active and passive attackers, conditioned upon the security guar-
antees and the collusion resistance of the configured EABE , the chosen plaintext security guarantees of
the configured ESYM , the guarantees of the configured RKE , and the forgery resistance of the configured
MAC.
Assume first the capabilities of a passive adversary under the weaker definition of the threat model.
In the very first step of the routine, the consumer and the authorization node perform RKE , and so an
eavesdropping adversary is not able to learn anything about the shared key that is used during the routine
so long as the guarantees of RKE hold. If an adversary modifies messages sent as a part of RKE , he or she
induces only a temporary disagreement in the shared key (renegotiation can be performed again), which
will be immediately detected by the consumer and authorization node upon integrity verification using
MAC so long as MAC is forgery resistant. Thus, conditioned on the guarantees of the configured RKE
and the forgery resistance guarantees of MAC, there is no risk of compromise of the shared key under
the defined threat model.
Because all subsequent communication is encrypted using the derived shared key and authenticated
via MAC, no eavesdropping adversary is able to gain any information about messages sent so long as
ESYM is IND-CPA secure, any modification to message content may be detected by either party so long
as MAC is forgery resistant, and corrupted messages may be re-sent and/or renegotiated so long as a
communication channel remains open between consumer and authorization node. Conditioned on the
chosen plaintext security of the configured ESYM and the forgery resistance guarantees of MAC, no asset
exchanged during Attribute-Authenticate has a risk of compromise by an active or passive adversary under
the weak definition of our threat model.
With regard to Attribute-Authenticate, an active participating adversary would attempt to induce a
future compromise by obtaining a MST which authorizes him or her for attributes he or she does not
have. Depending on the guarantees of the configured EABE , however, an adversary should not be able to
obtain the plaintext of the MST because it is encrypted (under ESYM ) using a key which is encrypted
(under EABE) using an access policy that is only satisfied if the consumer holds all of the attributes
advertised. Thus, under the inherent decryption guarantees and the chosen plaintext security of EABE ,
no adversary may obtain or distinguish a MST for which he or she should not be authorized under the
weak threat model. It is also not possible, by means of the collusion resistance of the configured EABE
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scheme, that adversarial key holders collude to produce a satisfying EABE key. As the only asset trans-
ferred by Attribute-Authenticate, the MST, is thus secure against both passive and active attackers, we
conclude that the attack surface exposed by Attribute-Authenticate is secure under the weak threat model.
Strong threat model. Under the strong threat model, we demonstrate that compromise of any asset
concerned by the Attribute-Authenticate routine is at the very least forward and online-recoverable.
Consider the capabilities of a worst-case adversary who has gained compromised access to the EABE
private key, the SSIG key-pair, and the SPSIG key-pair during the Attribute-Authenticate routine. As a
result of Attribute-Authenticate utilizingRKE without intermediate storage of shared keys, the adversary is
unable to re-derive or gain knowledge of non-compromised messages exchanged in the past, conditioned on
the guarantees and assumptions of RKE ; thus, any compromise of the assets held by the authorization node
is necessarily a forward compromise. Note that compromise of the SSIG key-pair of a valid authorization
node allows an adversary to forge master session tokens, potentially compromising assets exchanged in
the other routines of the protocol, meaning that such a compromise is not local. Assuming that some
number of system components and at least one authority remain uncompromised, such a compromise is
yet online-recoverable, as the protocol admits at least one means of online recovery:
1. Revoke the volatile authorization node attribute bound to forged MSTs by changing its representa-
tion and propagating it to all other active system components. This will cause verification of forged
MSTs to fail immediately if the protocol uses an attribute-based signature scheme.
2. Blacklist the compromised authorization node and any associated public keys. This will cause
verification of the forged MSTs to fail in the case that they are signed using SPSIG.
3. Provision a new authorization node having a replacement key for the revoked attribute.
4. Propagate knowledge of the existence of the new authorization node.
Consider now the capabilities of a worst-case adversary who has gained compromised access to the
private ABE key held by a valid consumer. Under the Attribute-Authenticate routine, such an adversary
may arbitrarily request, receive, and use MSTs he or she should not have. Because illegally obtained
MSTs do not allow an adversary to gain knowledge of assets transferred in the past, this compromise is a
forward compromise. This compromise is yet online-recoverable, as the protocol admits at least one key
revocation mechanism that prevents use of this compromised key:
1. Revoke at least one of the manifest volatile validation attributes associated with the compromised
key by changing its representation, presenting knowledge of the new representation publicly. Keys
using these validation attributes are thus effectively revoked, as they will not be serviced under the
protocol; granularity of revocation is inherently configured by the number of validation attributes
used within the system.
2. Re-issue keys with which the re-issued validation attribute is associated.
4.2.2 Put
Under the weak threat model, we demonstrate that the Put routine is secure with respect to all transferred
assets against active and passive attackers depending on the chosen plaintext security guarantees of the
configured EABE , the chosen plaintext security guarantees of the configured ESYM , the guarantees of the
configured RKE , the forgery resistance of the configured MAC, SSIG, and SPSIG.
In the case of a passive third party adversary, for the same reasons as given in our analysis of Attribute-
Authenticate, conditioned on the guarantees of the configured RKE and the collision-resistance guarantees
of MAC, there is no risk of compromise of the shared key under the defined threat model. As in the case
of Attribute-Authenticate, because all subsequent communication is encrypted using the derived key and
authenticated using MAC, no eavesdropping adversary is able to gain any information about messages
sent so long as ESYM is IND-CPA secure, any modification to message content by an active third party
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may be detected by either participating party so long as MAC is forgery resistant, and corrupted messages
may be re-sent or renegotiated so long as a communication channel remains open between consumer and
service node; thus, no asset exchanged during Put has risk of compromise by an active or passive third
party.
With regard to Put, a participating adversary may attempt to directly compromise a distributed re-
source asset by inducing a service node to commit a new resource for which he or she should not be
authorized. In order to do so, however, such an adversary would need to present a valid MST. Under the
weak threat model, we have shown that such an adversary cannot obtain a usable MST since he or she does
not hold the required attributes. In order to coerce the service node to accept a resource in this setting, the
adversary would need to forge a MST, which should not be possible, conditioned upon the assumptions and
guarantees of the configured SSIG and SPSIG. For these reasons, Put is secure from active participating
adversaries under the weak threat model.
Strong threat model. Under the strong threat model, we demonstrate that compromise of any asset
concerned by the Put routine is at the very least forward and online-recoverable.
Consider the capabilities of a worst-case adversary who has gained compromised complete access to
a service node, including its EABE key and stored encrypted data. Within the context of Put, such an
adversary may either (a) reject or deny service to users, (b) allow spurious writes to data, (c) passively
comply with the protocol, further exfiltrating and compromising future versions of the stored encrypted
data, or (d) modify stored data. By the nature of this adversary, all data compromised in this scenario
is forward compromised: past versions of data or transferred assets are not stored; in addition to this,
compromised data is encrypted and yields information only for an individual which holds a satisfying ABE
key. Assuming that some number of system components and at least one authority remain uncompromised,
such a compromise is online-recoverable, as the protocol admits at least one means of online recovery:
1. Revoke the volatile service node attribute5 held by the compromised service node.
2. Blacklist the compromised service node and any associated public keys.
3. Provision a new service node having a replacement key for the revoked attribute.
4. Propagate replacement service keys to active service nodes.
Consider now the capabilities of a worst-case adversary who has gained compromised access to the
private ABE key, the signature key-pair, or and the MST held by a valid consumer. Under the Put
routine, data to be written must be signed using SPSIG and the private key corresponding to PKself .
Assume first that this adversary has only the MST of a valid consumer. Unless this adversary also has
the ability to forge a signature corresponding to the public key SPSIG, the service node will reject the
put, meaning that control of a MST alone is merely a local compromise, as it cannot induce further
compromises without more information, conditioned on the assumptions and guarantees of the configured
SPSIG. If the adversary does have control of the consumer SPSIG private key, such an adversary would
likely also have control of the consumer private EABE key. In either case, this adversary would be able
to write arbitrarily through the service node. As was the case for Attribute-Authenticate, this forward
compromise is also online-recoverable, as the protocol admits at least one key revocation mechanism which
will invalidate both compromised keys and MSTs. If ever only the SPSIG private key is compromised
along with the MST, the protocol is self-recovering, as the MST will eventually expire.
4.2.3 Get
Under the weak threat model, we demonstrate that the Get routine is secure with respect to all transferred
assets against active and passive attackers depending on the chosen plaintext security guarantees of the
5This protocol may be easily adapted to allow for the system to make use of multiple service node attributes as opposed
to one.
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configured EABE , the chosen plaintext security guarantees of the configured ESYM , the guarantees of the
configured RKE , the forgery resistance of the configured MAC, SSIG, and SPSIG.
In the case of a passive third party, for the same reasons as given for Attribute-Authenticate, conditioned
on the guarantees of the configured RKE and the forgery resistance guarantees of MAC, there is no risk
of compromise of the shared key under the defined threat model. As in the case of Attribute-Authenticate,
because all subsequent communication is encrypted using the derived key and verified using MAC, no
eavesdropping adversary is able to gain any information about messages sent so long as ESYM is IND-CPA
secure, any modification to message content by an active eavesdropper may be detected by either party so
long as MAC is resistant to forgeries, and corrupted messages may be re-sent or renegotiated so long as
a communication channel remains open between consumer and service node; no asset exchanged during
Get has risk of compromise by an active or passive third party.
With regard to Get, an actively participating adversary may attempt to directly compromise a dis-
tributed resource asset by inducing a service node to send it data for which it is not authorized. In order
for the service node to transfer anything, however, such an adversary would need to present a valid MST.
Under the weak threat model, we have shown that such an adversary cannot obtain a usable MST since he
or she does not hold the required attributes. In order to coerce the service node to accept a modification in
this setting, the adversary would need to forge a MST, which should not be possible given the guarantees of
SPSIG. In addition to this, any data which is transferred is encrypted under a policy, and so the adversary
would not be able to gain anything from what is transferred unless he or she has also compromised a satisfy-
ing EABE key.
Strong Threat Model. Under the strong threat model, we demonstrate that compromise of any asset
concerned by the Get routine is at the very least forward and online-recoverable.
Consider the capabilities of a worst-case adversary who has gained compromised complete access to
a service node, including its EABE key and stored encrypted data. Within the context of Get, such an
adversary may send requesting consumers corrupt data as desired, exfiltrate encrypted data as desired,
or deny service as desired. By the nature of this adversary, all compromises of data in this scenario is
forward compromised: past versions of data or transferred assets are not stored. Among information
gained would be the MSTs of all valid consumers; however, these have no use without further compromise
of the consumer SPSIG private keys. Assuming that some number of system components and at least one
authority remain uncompromised, such a compromise is online-recoverable, by means of, for example, the
recovery mechanism described in the case of Put.
Consider now the capabilities of an adversary who has gained compromised access to either the private
ABE key, the signature key-pair, or a MST held by a valid consumer. Under the Get routine, resources
requested must be signed using SPSIG and the private key corresponding to PKself . By the same
argument as for Put, only the scenario in which the adversary has further compromised a satisfying ABE
key, the consumer private SSIG key, and the consumer MST yields a compromise; this compromise is a
forward, online-recoverable compromise which may be corrected via key revocation or simple MST expiry
as described in previous sections.
4.2.4 Write
Under the weak threat model, we demonstrate that the Write routine is secure with respect to all trans-
ferred assets against active and passive attackers depending on the chosen plaintext security guarantees
of the configured EABE , the chosen plaintext security guarantees of the configured ESYM , the guarantees
of the configured RKE , the forgery resistance of the configured MAC, SSIG, and SPSIG.
In the case of a passive third party adversary, for the same reasons as given in our analysis of Attribute-
Authenticate, conditioned on the guarantees of the configured RKE and the collision-resistance guarantees
of MAC, there is no risk of compromise of the shared key under the defined threat model. As in the case
of Attribute-Authenticate, because all subsequent communication is encrypted using the derived key and
authenticated using MAC, no eavesdropping adversary is able to gain any information about messages
sent so long as ESYM is IND-CPA secure, any modification to message content by an active third party
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may be detected by either participating party so long as MAC is forgery resistant, and corrupted messages
may be re-sent or renegotiated so long as a communication channel remains open between consumer and
service node; thus, no asset exchanged during Write has risk of compromise by an active or passive third
party.
With regard to Write, a participating adversary may attempt to directly compromise a distributed
resource asset by inducing a service node to commit a new resource for which he or she should not be
authorized. In order to do so, however, such an adversary would need to present a valid MST. Under the
weak threat model, we have shown that such an adversary cannot obtain a usable MST since he or she
does not hold the required attributes. In order to coerce the service node to accept a resource in this
setting, the adversary would need to forge a MST, which should not be possible, conditioned upon the
assumptions and guarantees of the configured SSIG and SPSIG. For these reasons, Write is secure from
active participating adversaries under the weak threat model.
Strong Threat Model. Under the strong threat model, it is the case that compromise of any asset
concerned by the Write routine is at the very least forward and online-recoverable by the same argument
as that for the forward, online-recoverability of compromises concerned by Put.
4.3 Scalable Security
A major requirement for any scalable storage system is that security is capable of scaling with performance.
To analyze the scalability of our protocol, we put forth a framework for quantifying the scalable secu-
rity of a protocol for a scalable system and further analyze our proposed protocol through this framework.
A measure for scalable security. We define scalable security as the capacity for a system to maintain
its instantaneous security guarantees as it scales up or down arbitrarily. To measure the support provided
by a protocol for achieving this quality, we introduce a construct which we call security-preserving scaling
effort.
Definition 4.7. Security-preserving Scaling Effort In a distributed system composed of categories of
components C1,C2, ...,Cn and a scaling action A, the security-preserving scaling effort of A is a function
SA(∣∣ C1 ∣∣, ..., ∣∣ Cn ∣∣) which provides a reasonable asymptotic upper bound on the number of operations
required such that the security guarantees of the system before A are the same as those after A completes.
In our analysis of the security-preserving scaling effort of our protocol, we define categories of com-
ponents A,AN,SN,C, respectively representing authorities, authorization nodes, service nodes and con-
sumers. Our analysis focuses on a set of scaling actions restricted to adding or removing an authority,
adding or removing an authorization node, adding or removing a service node, and adding or removing a
consumer; our scaling effort is defined with respect to the operations of sending messages to a single system
component and performing keying operations.
In this section, we demonstrate that our protocol requires a scaling effort linear in the number of authorities
for all defined scaling actions except for key revocation, which itself is linear per-revoked key in the number
of authorities and authorization nodes.
Adding or removing an authority. Our protocol does not involve direct interaction with authorities.
With respect to effort required in adding or removing an authority, the effort required by our protocol is
bounded by the number of operations required to make active authorities aware of the change, making
the change public to some interface to the key distribution mechanism, and potentially deriving a new
key for the new authority provisioned.
SA ∈ O(∣∣ A ∣∣) (1)
Adding or removing an authorization node. Within our protocol, when an authorization node is added
or removed, it must potentially be granted both an ABE key and a public keypair. Because the configured
ABE scheme may be multi-authority, it is possible that messages will have to be sent from each authority.
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Our protocol further assumes that knowledge of the locations of authorization nodes be made public; this
may be achieved in practice by making the change known to some set of public indexes.
SA ∈ O(∣∣ A ∣∣) (2)
Adding or removing a service node. Within our protocol, when a service node is added or removed, it
must potentially be granted an ABE key. Because the configured ABE scheme may be multi-authority,
it is possible that messages will have to be sent from each authority. Our protocol further assumes that
knowledge of the locations of service nodes be made public; this may be achieved in practice by making
the change known to some set of public indexes.
SA ∈ O(∣∣ A ∣∣) (3)
Adding a consumer. As long as a consumer has a public keypair and a valid ABE key, a consumer may
interact with the protocol. Thus, to add a new consumer, the only effort required is the generation of a
new ABE key the sending of that key to the consumer. In the worst case, the configured ABE scheme is
multi-authority, and so messages must be sent from each authority to the new consumer.
SA ∈ O(∣∣ A ∣∣) (4)
Removing a consumer. In order to remove a consumer, that consumer’s ABE key must be invalidated.
In order to do this, the representation of at least one validity attribute vx must be changed, thereby
revoking the keys of all consumers C ∈ v requiring vx to properly authenticate. Keys must be re-issued
to all of such consumers. In order for the change to be enforced, the change must be propagated to all
active authorization nodes.
SA ∈ O(∣∣ v ∣∣∣∣ A ∣∣ + ∣∣ AN ∣∣) (5)
5 Future Work
5.1 Implementation
To explore the feasibility and utility of this protocol, we have undertaken the implementation6 of a simple
manifestation of this protocol.
The target system is a simple single-master, many-worker distributed file system in the tone of GFS[4]
with a flat namespace and simple access control achieved through an implementation of the protocol
described in this work. The specific configuration of the protocol implemented is as follows:
1. Waters08[13] as a CP-ABE scheme.
2. A custom extension of Waters08 using AES-256 to achieve variable-length encryption using CP-ABE.
3. RSA-2048 as a public-key signature scheme.
4. AES-256/CBC-MAC for variable-length symmetric-key encryption with MAC
5. Diffie-Hellman as a key exchange routine.
This and future implementations of the proposed protocol will be valuable so as to demonstrate the
practical challenges and factors to consider in evaluating different configurations of the given protocol.
5.2 Performance Analysis in Context
The introduction of the devised scheme will undoubtedly affect the performance of the system which uses
it. Future work should concern itself with applying the given protocol to existing systems and performing
an a nalysis in performance relative to increased security.
6At the time of this work, the partial implementation of this system may be found here: https://github.com/ad-alston/aefs
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5.3 Improvement and Standards for CP-ABE
Though the proposed protocol provides a means of addressing the issue of scalable authorization, au-
thentication, and transmission in distributed storage systems, its design, analysis, and implementation
suggest areas of exploration relating to both feasibility and utility of CP-ABE schemes. Current schemes
are non-standard, varying vastly in performance and complexity; likewise, the lack of maturity of ABE
schemes has prevented the appearance of different modes of encryption under CP-ABE schemes. A specific
direction for improvement would be the introduction of variable-length encryption modes for CP-ABE,
modes desired by the protocol proposed in this work.
5.4 Logging and Compromise Detection
The proposed protocol admits methods for recovering from compromise both internally and externally.
When master session tokens or the private keys of users are used to interact with the system, the mechanics
of the protocol have a side effect that they generate information at service and authorization nodes about
the keys being used in the form of validation attributes. Given some volume of the access patterns for
both volatile validation attributes and manifest non-volatile attributes of users, how can the logging and
analysis of these access patterns provide additional benefit to the system employing the protocol?
One possible area of exploration involves the detection of and reaction to the compromise of private
keys and tokens among users. It may be possible to issue validation attributes on some identifiable basis
in order to be able to detect anomalies in key usage. As a simple example, the system may distribute
validation attributes on the basis of geographic region. If there is, say, a high frequency of authorization
requests from a region in which a certain validation attribute was not issued, the system may be able to
infer that keys within that region have been compromised and recover accordingly. Another venue for
future work could be the exploration of using the structure and function of validation attributes to trace
both traitors and eager attackers: by introducing the equivalent of honey-attributes, it may be possible
to detect attempted compromise and/or attempted treason by otherwise valid consumers.
5.5 Coordination and Replication
Many distributed storage systems such as DynamoDB[3] opt for non-centralized architectures that rely
heavily on coordination and quorum-like techniques. With respect to the mechanics of the protocol, how
might the coordination techniques used by these systems be transitioned to allow for the implementation
of mechanisms which make use of coordination among authorization nodes and service nodes? Similarly,
what benefits can be offered by these mechanisms?
A direct application of such coordination lies in internal system auditing in systems which employ
replication. If a system component is suspicious to an individual user (or other system component), it
may be useful for service nodes to vote on the integrity of the state or actions of that component; similarly,
if attacks affecting integrity can be identified, coordination among replicas may be used to recover.
5.6 Key Distribution, Knowledge Propagation, and Recovery
Though the analysis of the protocol under the strong threat model defined in this paper identifies that
recoveries are online-recoverable, the protocol itself does not directly concern itself with how a system
should be adapted to perform online recovery. In the case of key revocation, future work should explore
the mechanics of system components responsible for coordinating with the system authority(ies), propa-
gating attribute representation changes, and delivering renewed keys as needed. For recovery in the case
of compromised system components, future work should also explore means for a system to provision
replacements and segregate those components which have been compromised.
Recent work by Wang et. al. introduces a method of using key homomorphism and secret sharing
to achieve a means of key revocation and two-factor authentication [11]. While they propose using
this method to reconstruct the master secret key under the used KP-ABE scheme, it may be possible
within the scope of our protocol to use this method to devise a secure key distribution mechanism to be
Page 18
Attribute-based Encryption for Authorization in Distributed Storage Systems
Aubrey Alston (ada2145@columbia.edu)
used to reconstruct master secret keys among controlled system components before re-distributing keys.
Similarly, key homomorphism may be used within the scope of our protocol as a measure for re-encrypting
compromised stored assets without system components gaining knowledge of the asset’s plaintext.
6 Conclusion
In this work, we have introduced a protocol for attribute-based encryption for authentication, authoriza-
tion, storage, and transmission of distributed resources which addresses the problem of achieving scalable
security in distributed storage systems that require fine-grained access control among large numbers of
semi-anonymous consumers. We further analyzed this protocol through a general threat model which
can be used to analyze the security guarantees of a distributed storage system under these constraints.
Through design, implementation, and analysis of this protocol, we have identified future opportunities for
exploration admitted by this protocol which additionally allow for internal and external threat detection,
automatic recovery, and automated key revocation.
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